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ABSTRACT 
When groups of platforms, sensors, and weapons are able to communicate with 
each other in real-time, they form a network.  Modern warfare increasingly involves 
network-centric operations, the military strategy that seeks to translate informational 
advantages gained through the cooperation of all platforms in the network into increased 
overall mission effectiveness.  For this thesis, the Time-to-Kill is our metric to quantify 
mission effectiveness because a given time-sensitive target is vulnerable to attack only 
for a very short time.  This thesis develops an optimizing heuristic kill chain assessment 
tool, “KCAT,” that (a) rapidly identifies capability gaps and (b) generates guaranteed 
feasible schedules that minimize the time-to-kill for a given air-to-ground strike scenario.  
KCAT allows warfare analysts, budget programmers, and mission planners to 
quantitatively examine the value of network-centric warfare in time-sensitive targeting 
scenarios.  In addition to optimizing existing platform and weapon network effectiveness, 
KCAT allows experimentation with future concepts and capabilities that are important 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We wish to develop the capability to destroy time-sensitive targets as quickly as 
possible, and we wish to ascertain the technical capabilities that are critical to this 
objective.   
The threat we face today from theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) is enormous and 
growing larger.  Numerous countries of interest possess TBMs, and some pursue their 
development as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction.  When precise 
intelligence on the transformer-erector launchers (TELs) that launch TBMs becomes 
available, we must have the capability to destroy them quickly.  This capability is vital to 
our ability to secure and dominate the battle space.  Additionally, we need to identify the 
areas in which we lack the technical means to accomplish rapid time-sensitive strike.   
The Warfare Analysis and Integration Branch of the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), located at China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station, CA, conducts 
analysis of alternatives studies for platform and weapon systems, as well as sensitivity 
analyses for Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).  The air-to-ground strike kill chain, the 
sequence of events that must occur successfully in correct sequence in order for a strike 
aircraft to destroy a ground target, is at the heart of these analyses.  Current analytical 
methods use simulation and manual analysis.  These analyses address individual target 
kill chains vice multiple kill chains occurring simultaneously. 
We develop a kill chain assessment tool (KCAT) that builds feasible schedules for 
multiple simultaneous kill chains.  KCAT run times on a 3.16 GHz Dell Quad-core 
desktop computer at the Naval Postgraduate School have never exceeded two seconds for 
a scenario involving as many as 45 targets and 12 platforms.  KCAT uses a Microsoft 
Excel interface and produces output in Microsoft Excel.  KCAT can thus be rapidly 
distributed and reliably operated in a variety of computing environments without the 
expense and difficulty of software licenses or special training.  In particular, KCAT can 
run on Navy-Marine Corps Intranet Computers (NMCI). 
 xiv
 KCAT produces feasible solutions for multiple simultaneous kill chains.  KCAT 
performs well under the assumptions we have stated for a wide variety of scenario 
starting configurations and associated constraints.  Heuristic improvements significantly 
reduce the maximum time-to-kill for many scenarios, and KCAT results look face-valid.   
KCAT outputs allow the planner to analyze air-to-ground attack scenarios quickly and 
effectively.  These analyses inform larger questions related to platform and weapon 
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A. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
The Warfare Analysis and Integration Branch of the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), located at China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station, CA, conducts 
analysis-of-alternatives studies for platform and weapon systems, as well as sensitivity 
analyses for Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).  The air-to-ground strike kill chain, the 
sequence of events that must occur successfully in correct sequence in order for a strike 
aircraft to destroy a ground target, is at the heart of these analyses.  The lack of a flexible, 
quick, and accurate network-centric kill chain model significantly hampers the ability of 
NAVAIR to produce analyses rapidly.  This thesis develops an analysis tool that 
produces feasible schedules for multiple simultaneous kill chains:  the Kill Chain 
Assessment Tool (KCAT).      
 We use an unclassified scenario called “Ithaca” as a case study.  We break down 
or combine the most frequently used phases of the kill chain, Find–Fix–Target–Track–
Engage–Assess (F2T2EA), into functional areas that are specific to the air-to-ground 
strike mission:  Detect–Track–Identify–Approve–Launch-Control-Assess.  KCAT 
assigns platforms and weapons to targets, and produces feasible schedules that assign all 
phases of the kill chain to scenario targets.   
We develop a heuristic to optimize air-to-ground kill chains, rather than using 
commercial mathematical-programming software.  KCAT can thus be rapidly distributed 
and reliably operated in a variety of computing environments without the expense and 
difficulty of software licenses or special training.  In particular, KCAT can run on Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet Computers (NMCI). 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. Problem Statement 
 Kill Chain analysis is not new.  Researchers have studied kill chains for years; the 
resulting analyses have identified important current and future capability gaps.  These 
capability gaps, once identified, become critical acquisition issues for the Navy and the 
Department of Defense.  While recent analyses of kill chains have successfully identified 
capability gaps, to date there have been no kill chain models that support planning 
multiple simultaneous kill chains against multiple targets.  The primary contribution of 
this thesis is the development of an analysis tool that accomplishes the feasible 
construction of such kill chains.  Future research can build upon this work to produce 
provably optimal solutions.  
 KCAT is the first decision support tool that explicitly models the time-to-kill for 
several kill chains at once.    KCAT represents a significant step beyond NAVAIR’s 
current analysis techniques that only identify capability gaps in single kill chains.  
Furthermore, KCAT is prescriptive, in contrast to the existing descriptive analyses. 
 We envision using KCAT to analyze missions associated with a major 
contingency operation (MCO), and drawing tactical, operational, or strategic insights 
from the results.  These insights can inform current CONOPS planning, and may suggest 
new alternative solutions.  KCAT allows the planner to evaluate future platform or 
weapon systems within the context of their proposed mission.  We assess the relative 
importance of the individual phases of the kill chain by examining scenarios that attack 
time-sensitive targets.    
2. Definitions and Terms 
We use the following terms throughout this thesis:   
 Kill Chain.  The sequence of events that must succeed to destroy a target.  The most 
common usage of the term includes Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess 
(F2T2EA).  This thesis tailors the generic kill chain to specifically address air-to-
ground strikes: 
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o Detect – perceive an object of possible military interest  
o Track – precisely and continuously find targets by radar, visual, or other 
means 
o Identify – correlate a contact of interest (COI) with a desired target via visual, 
forward-looking infrared, radar, or other means sufficiently well to  release 
ordnance 
o Approve – a higher authority gives permission to commence attack 
o Launch – a weapon is released from its host platform 
o Control – providing the information necessary to a weapon after launch 
o Assess – determining effects of attacks on targets 
 Platform.  U.S. or coalition military aircraft that can be used in air-to-ground strike. 
 Weapon.  Air-to-ground ordnance that scenario platforms may carry. 
 Target.  The object of the attack. 
 Pd.  The probability of a weapon successfully damaging a target. 
 Pk.  The probability of a weapon successfully destroying a target. 
 Operational range.  The range at which a weapon, when released, is expected to 
achieve a Pd of at least 0.7; in other words, the desired release distance from the 
target. 
 Maximum weapon kinematic range.  The maximum distance that a weapon can 
travel.   
 Maximum weapon acquisition range.  The maximum distance at which a weapon can 
acquire a target with an on-board sensor. 
 Weapon detection range.  The range at which a weapon is first capable of detecting its 
intended target.   
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 Weapon minimum range.  The minimum distance from a target that a weapon can be  
released and still successfully reach the target. 
 Time-sensitive target.  A target with a limited period of vulnerability to attack, or a 
target that will become a serious threat within a short period of time. 
 Strike package.  The group of platforms working together to achieve an air-to-ground 
strike. 
C. HISTORY OF KILL CHAIN ANALYSIS 
Kill chain analysis is not new.  There are two major Navy programs focused on 
kill chain analysis:  (1) The Program Manager, Precision Strike Weapons (PMA 201) Kill 
Chain Analysis Process (KCAP 201) of 2006  (Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-201, 
2006) and (2) Horizontal Integration and Capability Based Assessment Program 
(HICAP), which is ongoing at NAVAIR (Smith, 2008). 
The purpose of the PMA 201 Kill Chain Analysis is to look for areas in the kill 
chain that are broken or weak, within the context of specific missions.  The primary areas 
of interest are land-moving target missions, time-critical target missions, and air-to-air 
missions.  In its initial analysis, KCAP 201 assessed 46 different kill chains using data 
and subject-matter expertise from 14 NAVAIR program management offices.  KCAP 201 
used Microsoft Excel and an activity-based version of System Architect, a Department of 
Defense “Architecture Framework” tool owned and marketed by Telelogic (IBM, 2009), 
to perform kill chain scoring and to generate kill chain outputs.  KCAP 201 successfully 
identified several broken kill chains, generated associated issue sheets (a standard form 
for troubleshooting capability gaps that usually leads to procurement), and in some cases 
was able to obtain funding approval to implement required changes  (Naval Air Systems 
Command, PMA-201, 2006). 
HICAP is an ongoing NAVAIR project that seeks to increase the degree of 
integrated warfighting capability and interoperability from the resources available.  It 
aims to re-focus the Navy procurement system on desired mission end-states rather than 
on individual capabilities that may or may not contribute to the end-states.  HICAP 
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accomplishes this through a complex integration process involving CONOPS working 
groups, program management offices, Fleet inputs, threat assessments, and kill chain 
analyses.  In HICAP, for a given kill chain, analysts manually apply stoplight scoring 
(i.e., grading as “red,” “yellow,” or “green,” based on standardized thresholds) to each 
step of a kill chain for individual scenarios.  HICAP then integrates kill chain analyses 
with threat assessments over a time horizon.  The result is an answer to the question “In 
the context of the Kill Chain Scenario and Fleet approved CONOPS, does the capability 
exist to effectively employ the weapon against the target of interest?”  The answers to 
this question for various scenarios then inform decisions about procurement (Smith, 
2008). 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Kill chains describe any sequence of events resulting in a successful attack.  Here, 
we address kill chains for air-to-ground strikes of time-sensitive mobile transformer-
erecter launchers (TEL) targets.  For our baseline scenario, we limit our analysis to four 
platforms and 12 weapons, and explore variations in number of targets, number of 
platforms, and weapon types.  KCAT has the capability to examine many other types of 
scenarios as well.   
This thesis simplifies three of the kill chain phases for modeling purposes.  For 
example, the “Approval” phase consists of a very complex and dispersed network 
involving multiple platforms, communications networks, and command and control 
facilities.  Thus, the time required for attack approval varies greatly, and depends upon 
the particular circumstances of the desired attack.  We likewise simplify the “Detect” and 
“Identify” phases so that we can focus on the development of the overall optimization 
algorithm.   
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins with an explanation of Ithaca, the fictitious region in which kill 
chain scenarios are constructed.  We then present a brief overview of the theater ballistic 
missile (TBM) threat and time-sensitive strike (TST).  Lastly, we discuss the air-to-
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ground kill chain in detail.  Chapter III describes our air-to-ground strike kill chain 
optimization model and the heuristic algorithm we invented to solve it.  Chapter IV 















Because this thesis is unclassified, an imaginary location called “Ithaca” will 
serve as the geographic setting for KCAT scenarios.  The Warfare Analysis and 
Integration Branch of NAVAIR derived Ithaca from the USWESTCOM Joint 
Intelligence Center scenario “Pacifica” of 2003.  Adjustments from the original Pacifica 
scenario include changing country names, revising the socio-political background, and 
updating the order of battle (Loibl, 2008). 
Two joint U.S.-UK projects have utilized the Ithaca scenario.  Ithaca’s focus is on 
naval air forces; it currently does not include land, surveillance assets, or logistics forces.  
NAVAIR and other organizations use Ithaca for various warfare analyses. 
This thesis uses the portions of Ithaca related to the tactical ballistic missile 
(TBM) threat.  Although Ithaca is fictitious, the scenario mirrors the reality of several 
real-world situations very closely, and thus the analytical results obtained using Ithaca are 
quite realistic.  We use unclassified data throughout this thesis in terms of TBM dwell 
times, weapon capabilities, etc.; however, the planner can easily modify these parameters 
to match reality. 
2. Geographic Description 
Ithaca is an island that incorporates the states of California, Oregon, Nevada, and 
Arizona, but shifted from actual latitudes and longitudes by -10 degrees and -80 degrees, 
respectively.  This places Ithaca in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Guam.  The 
approximate position of the center of Ithaca’s land mass is 20° N, 165° E.   
Three fictitious nations share the island of Ithaca:  Trinacria (California), Scheria 
(Nevada and Arizona), and Cythera (Oregon).  Trinacria is an aggressor nation that 
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attacks Scheria in order to take full control of shared natural resources.  When Scheria 
appeals to the international community for security assistance, Trinacria threatens to 
attack coalition forces coming to Scheria’s aid; Trinacria repositions its ballistic and 
cruise missile launchers accordingly.   
Trinacria has a robust integrated air defense system (IADS).  The Trinacria IADS 
includes 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th generation fighter interceptors, strategic surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) batteries, anti-air artillery (AAA) batteries, and early warning radar.  One 
air defense operations center maintains situational awareness of air operations.  Trinacria 
bases its defensive doctrine on multiple layers of defense:  fighter interceptors, SAMs, 
and AAA (Loibl, 2008). 
3. Trinacrian Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Threat 
Trinacria poses a robust ballistic missile threat.  Table 1 describes the three 
different types of Trinacrian ballistic missile launchers and missiles.   
 
System Status Range Missiles CW 
Warheads 
Launchers Reloads/TEL
SRBM Type 1 OP 400 km 294 None 10 29.4 
SRBM Type 2 OP 700 km 295 Possible 15 19.6 
MRBM OP 2250 km 121 Possible 25 4.8 
Table 1.   Trinacria Ballistic Missile Threat. From left to right, the SRBM Type 2 missile 
system is operational with a range of 700 km.  295 such missiles are in stock, and 
each is capable of carrying a chemical warhead.  There are 15 SRBM Type 2 
launchers in Trinacria, and they each have an average of 19.6 missile reloads per 
TEL. 






Area Range SRBM Type 1 
TELs 
SRBM Type 2 
TELs 
MRBM TELs 
TBM A-1 700 km 0 5 12 
TBM A-2 400 km 10 0 0 
TBM A-3 700 km 0 10 13 
Table 2.   Trinacrian TBM launch areas. From left to right, the maximum range of the 
types of TELs operating within TBM Area 1 is 700 km, the number of SRBM 
Type 1 TELs in TBM Area 1 is zero, the number of SRBM Type 2 TELs in 
TBM Area 1 is five, and the number of MRBM TELs in Area 1 is 12. 
 
Figure 1 depicts these launch areas. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Trinacrian TBM launch areas (From: Google Maps).  Each circle 
represents the maximum range for the launch area as described in Table 2. 
TBM Area 1 
TBM Area 3 
TBM Area 2 
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4.  Trinacrian TBM CONOPS and Timeline  
 We base the Trinacrian TBM CONOPS and timeline of this thesis on a scenario 
presented by an earlier thesis that analyzed the kill chain for time-critical strike (Brickner, 
2005). 
Within each TBM Area, there are numerous sites for transformer-erector 
launchers (TELs) to either hide or launch missiles.  Trinacrian TBM CONOPS call for 
two launch waves per day:  the first wave launches from 0600–1000, and the second from 
1800–2200. 
TBMs depart from random hidden sites on command, in order to achieve all 
launches for that wave within a 25-minute epoch.  The launch site, relative to the hidden 
site, must be between 4.3 and 43 nm away.  We compute the travel time of each TBM 
assuming a straight-line distance and an average speed of 21.5 mph.  After arrival to the 
launch site, TBM launch occurs in 14–22 minutes for SRBMs, and 25–35 minutes for 
MRBMs.  After launch, TBMs depart the launch site for a new hide site in 1–3 minutes 
for SRBMs and 3–6 minutes for MRBMs.  The new hide site, once again, must be 
between 4.3 and 43nm away (Brickner, 2005). 
B. THE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE CHALLENGE 
1. Background 
Ballistic missiles pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. and coalition forces 
overseas, and increasingly, to the continental United States.  Many countries view 
ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons, and as symbols of national 
power.  They present an asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower, but most alarming of all 
they can carry weapons of mass destruction over long distances. 
Ballistic missiles are attractive to many nations because they are relatively 
inexpensive but effective even against an opponent with a robust air defense network.  
Ballistic missiles enable attacks where attacks with manned aircraft would be impractical 
or prohibitively expensive (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2009). 
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Ballistic missiles are currently in widespread development.  Many organizations 
expect their number and variety to increase in the near future.  They are useful as 
deterrent or coercive weapons, and have fewer maintenance, training, and logistic 
requirements than manned aircraft.  Mobile transformer-erector launchers (TELs) are 
very survivable because they can be hidden easily, thus making them difficult to attack. 
Warring nations have used ballistic missiles in several conflicts over the last 25 
years, including the Iran–Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf 
conflicts, and the Russian military action in Chechnya and Georgia. 
The ballistic missile threat continues to increase as missile technology proliferates 
throughout the world.  Over 20 countries currently have ballistic missile systems; thus, 
almost assuredly, ballistic missiles will be involved in future conflicts involving U.S. 
forces. (Feickert, 2005). 
2. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) 
There are two components of theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD):  
counterforce and active defense.  Counterforce refers to destroying the missile launcher 
before it successfully achieves launch, i.e., pre-launch, whereas active defense refers to 
attacking the missile after it has been launched, i.e., post-launch. 
Most current TBMD plans center around the active defense strategy.  Practitioners 
of active defense seek to exploit the vulnerabilities that a missile in flight presents at 
various phases of its trajectory.  A ballistic missile in flight is certainly difficult to attack, 
but active defense considers it easier to detect and attack such a missile than a hidden, 
mobile launcher.  Brown et al. (2005) develop an optimization model that plans the pre-
positioning of ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an 
attacker can achieve.  Combatant commanders use this and other models to make the best 
use of TBMD platforms engaged in an active defense strategy. 
Combatant commanders as well as academics have traditionally considered 
counterforce strategies more difficult to perform than active defense strategies.  
Adversaries can hide TELs easily; SRBM and MRBM launchers are mobile and can 
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launch a missile within minutes of arriving at a launch site.  This makes it very difficult 
to attack such a launcher in time to prevent a successful launch.  Threat nations can hide 
and harden their intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and ICBM missile launch 
facilities against attack with relative ease, once again making the counterforce strategy 
very challenging.   
Marshall (1994) draws an analogy between anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and 
theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD).   He indicates that both missions require very 
similar actions in sequence:  searching, detecting, localizing, classifying, and attacking 
the contact of interest.  Marshall applies the lessons learned over many years of ASW to 
TBMD:  “Notice that ASW was never referred to as torpedo defense.  Attempts were not 
made to kill the torpedo in the water; efforts were always concentrated on going after the 
launcher (the submarine) or the infrastructure necessary for it to operate.” 
He develops a mathematical model that analyzes the effects of counterforce and 
active defense strategies, and states his results as follows: “It is shown that without 
counterforce an active defense system could require an impractical number of weapons to 
counter incoming missiles and/or their warheads.  This number is shown to decrease 
geometrically as effective counterforce is used, so that the expected number of warheads 
killed increases dramatically with counterforce that is only modestly effective.”  
He concludes his analysis by stating that both counterforce and active defense 
should be essential elements in any future TBMD system:   
Without counterforce it will be relatively easy for the enemy to overwhelm 
a feasible active defense system.  A system that can successfully destroy 
launchers and their crews will provide considerable leverage in reducing 
the numbers of active defense weapons required; this leverage increases 
dramatically as the number of warheads on each missile increases... the 
successful counterforce against launchers on land will require efforts in 
cueing, search, detection, localization, classification, and destruction.  
Current efforts can be thought of as attempting to skip from cueing (for 
example, framing datum information after launch) to attack.  Future 
reports will consider how one might best accomplish the in-between 
phases to produce successful counterforce against mobile missile 
launchers. 
 13
One objective of this thesis is to provide a mechanism by which analysts can 
examine such counterforce strategies, in light of newly available technologies related to 
stealth, detection, and high-speed weapons.   
C. TIME-SENSITIVE STRIKE CONSIDERATIONS IN TBMD 
1. Background 
Time sensitive conventional strike from long standoff ranges into restricted or 
denied territory has been an operational, policy, and acquisition challenge for a long time.  
This difficult mission has appeared in many studies and reports as a hard problem for 
which no satisfactory solution appears readily available.  In situations where time is not a 
factor, or where the U.S. has sufficient forces deployed nearby, the U.S. has 
demonstrated its ability to strike at identified threats effectively (Defense Science Board, 
2009). 
According to the Defense Science Board (DSB), “...the current DoD focus on 
delivery platforms for Time Critical Strike needs to be balanced with a considerably 
increased focus on ISR, munitions, C3, SOF, and exercises.”  The DSB found that 
“Covert, loitering strike systems enabled by robust target ISR and tracking, C3 and fire 
control capabilities would revolutionize global strike for both the long war and for 
deterrence of rogue and near-peer nations.”  
Regarding SCUD usage during Operation DESERT STORM, General 
Schwarzkopf stated, “The (SCUD) launchers turned out to be more elusive than we’d 
expected.  We picked off a few, but just as often bombers would streak to a site where a 
missile had been launched only to find empty desert.”  
Wilson (2002) maintains that the realization of the U.S. military’s shortfalls in its 
ability to attack fleeting, mobile targets has resulted in an increased emphasis on time-
critical targeting by both military and civilian leadership.  Time-sensitive targets will 
most likely continue to present the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with a significant 
challenge in future conflicts.  In order to engage targets in single-digit minutes by the  
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year 2015, a combination of hypersonic missiles and unmanned combat air vehicles, 
utilizing Advanced Targeting Recognition and the global information grid, will be 
necessary (Wilson, 2002). 
D. ELEMENTS OF THE AIR-TO-GROUND STRIKE KILL CHAIN 
1. Generic Air-to-Ground Strike Kill Chain Model 
The term “kill chain” is general in nature, and can refer to any situation in which a 
sequence of events is required to destroy a target.  For air-to-ground strike, kill chains are 
sequences of events that must each succeed in order for an air-to-ground attack to be 
successful. 
Kill chains focus on the target, not a particular attacking platform.  The phases of 
the kill chain are not things that a platform must do to attack a target with success, but 
instead things that some combination of platforms for each target must achieve. 
The most commonly used form of the kill chain is “F2T2EA,” or Find–Fix–
Track–Target–Engage–Assess.  In this model, friendly platforms work together to find 
targets, and then they fix the target’s location with enough precision to enable an 
engagement.  Next, they track the target; eventually, friendly platforms pass the target’s 
location information to a platform carrying a weapon for launch.  This platform launches 
the weapon, and then the platform supports the weapon in-flight, as required, until 
impact.  Finally, a friendly platform assesses the target area in order to determine whether 
the attack was successful. 
2. KCAT Kill Chain  
In this thesis, we take the generic kill chain model and modify it based on 
operational activities in order to capture more accurately he essential elements of air-to-
ground strike with time criticality.  Our modified sequence is Detect–Track–Identify–
Approve–Launch–Control–Assess. 
The first phase of KCAT’s kill chain model is “Detect.”  In this phase, platforms 
attempt to detect contacts of interest (COI).  When one platform detects a COI it then 
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shares the COI with all of the platforms with which it has a data link.  The end of the 
“Detect” phase for a given target occurs when at least one friendly platform has detected 
it as a COI. 
Our “Track” phase combines the “Fix” and “Track” phases of the generic kill 
chain model.  We do this because tracking a target continuously already includes taking 
an initial fix.  Tracking means continuously maintaining location information on a target 
with enough precision to engage the target.  The track phase is operationally complete 
when a friendly platform passes the target’s coordinates to another friendly platform with 
a weapon.  However, before commencing the engagement of a target, a friendly platform 
must first successfully identify the target and gain approval for its engagement from 
higher authority.   
“Identification” is how friendly platforms correlate the COI to the desired target.  
Identification begins after target tracking has commenced, and must conclude before the 
granting of attack approval.   
“Approve” refers to the necessity for permission from higher authority to release 
ordnance.  Approval uses a very complex communication network.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, we assume higher authority grants approval automatically and 
instantaneously; however, this is a crude approximation of reality. 
Once friendly platforms detect the target, pinpoint its location, identify it as the 
desired target, and receive authorization to release a weapon, a platform may then launch 
its air-to-ground ordnance.  We refer to this as the “Launch” phase. 
In the “Control” phase, after a platform launches a weapon, the weapon may 
require further in-flight target information updates.  Some weapons do not require 
support, but may have functionality for in-flight cueing.  The control phase concludes 
with weapon impact. 
In order to determine the success of an attack, friendly platforms must perform a 
battle damage assessment.  We refer to this as the “Assess” phase.   Completion of this 
event concludes the kill chain for this target. 
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III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
A. MODEL OVERVIEW 
 We design the Kill Chain Assessment Tool (KCAT) for use as a scenario-based 
CONOPS analysis tool with a Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, 2009) interface and Microsoft 
Excel output. 
 The interface allows the planner to specify an air-ground strike scenario.  The 
scenario includes choices of friendly platforms, weapons, enemy targets, and their 
relative positions on a map.  The output identifies which platforms and weapons are best 
to use in the attack scenario, and provides schedules for each kill chain to minimize the 
total time required to complete the attack mission.   
B. AN INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM TO OPTIMIZE AIR-TO-GROUND 
STRIKE KILL CHAINS 
Because a kill chain involves a sequence of tasks that platforms must accomplish 
in order, the problem of scheduling platforms to perform the tasks is very much like a 
manufacturing-style scheduling problem.  We draw an analogy between a production 
scheduling problem and an air-to-ground strike kill chain as follows:  we consider a 
manufacturing “job” to be the prosecution of one target; each available platform is 
considered a “machine” in the factory; and each phase of the kill chain is considered a 
“stage” in the production process (Pinedo, 1995). 
There are many different types of project scheduling models, but two classes of 
standard project scheduling problems closely mirror the implementation of a kill chain:  
the flexible flow shop model and the open shop model. 
In a flexible flow shop, there are s stages in series with m machines in parallel at 
each stage.  The flow shop processes jobs first at stage 1, then at stage 2, and so on.  A 
stage functions as a bank of parallel machines; at each stage, job j requires only one 
machine and, usually, any of the machines in that stage can process job j.  This is similar 
to the air-to-ground strike kill chain in that the phases of the kill chain correlate to the 
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stages of a production process, and there are a number of platforms available at each 
stage to perform a phase of the kill chain for that target.  However, in the flexible flow 
shop model, the machines in each stage are different from the machines in the other 
stages.  In the air-to-ground strike kill chain, because the machines are platforms that 
move, and which are re-used throughout all stages of the kill chain, the flexible flow shop 
model is not an exact match. 
The open shop differs from the flexible flow shop in that the routes of the jobs are 
unspecified, whereas in the flexible flow shop all jobs must follow the same route 
(Pinedo, 1995).  This more closely matches the air-to-ground strike kill chain because 
now the phases of the kill chain can be assigned to any machine in any order.  An 
elaborate set of constraints then captures the other complex characteristics of the kill 
chain related to platform and weapon capabilities or limitations. 
1. Model Assumptions 
A number of model assumptions play a role in our formulation and heuristic 
solver:       
  “No-wait”:  Transitions from phase to phase in a kill chain for a target proceed 
without gaps.  There is no gap between the “Track” phase and “Identify” phase 
because then the entire kill chain would have to restart from the “Detect” phase; 
 The air-ground target identification rate is 100% when platforms and their associated 
sensors are within maximum detection range; 
 The model uses probability of damage (Pd) values, vice other measures of weapon 
effectiveness (e.g., “mobility kill” data from a joint munitions effectiveness manual); 
 Platforms with sensors capable of providing positive confirmation of target status, 
such as infrared (IR), electro-optical (EO), or visual image, are able to do so with 
100% accuracy when the platform is within detection range; and 
 Every launch of a weapon from within the weapon’s acceptable launch range results 
in a successful attack. 
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We now provide a mathematical formulation of the kill chain optimization 
problem, KCOPT.   
2. Index and Set Use 
p P    platform (alias 'p ) 
t T    target (alias 't ) 
w W    weapon 
f F    phase of a kill chain (alias 'f ) 
  
  Detect,Track,Identify,Approve,Launch,Control,AssessF   
( , ') Precludef f   pairs of distinct kill chain phases that cannot be executed  
  simultaneously by the same platform 
3. Data [Units] 
,p fcapability  the maximum number of separate targets on which platform p can 
perform phase f (represents data link or sensor capacity of 
platform) 
, ,p t fprocess  the minimum amount of time that platform p requires in order to 
perform phase f of the kill chain on target t 
, , , ', 'p t f t fsetup  the amount of time that a platform requires to move from 
performing phase f on target t to performing phase f’ on target t’ 
pwinv    the number of weapons carried by platform p 
4. Decision Variables 
, ,p t fSTART  the start time that platform p begins performing kill chain phase f 
for target t 
, ,p t fEND  the end time that platform p begins performing kill chain phase f 
for target t 
 
, ,
1 if platform executes kill chain phase on target
0 otherwisep t f
p f t
X    
  
, , , ' '
1 if executes on strictly before 'on '
0 otherwisep t f t f
p f t f t
Y    
, , ', ', '
1 if executes on simultaneously with 'on '
0 otherwisep t f t f
p f t f t
Z    
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5. Formulation KCOPT 
, , , ,
min
START END X Y Z
 max (0)C  
        s.t. max , , , (1)p t AssessC END p t   
 , , 1 ', , , , 1
'
* 1 , , (2)p t f p t f p t f
p
START END M X p t f Assess       
, , , , , , , ,* , , (3)p t f p t f p t f p t fEND START process X p t f    
, ', ' , , , , , ', ' , , , ', '
, ', ', , , , , ', '
* (4)
*( ) , , , ', '
p t f p t f p t f t f p t f t f
p t f t f p t f t f
START END setup Y
M Y Z p t f t f
 
    
, , , ', ' , ', ', , 1 , ', ( , ') Preclude (5)p t f t f p t f t fY Y p t t f f      
, , , ', ' , , , ', ' , ', ', , 1 , ', ( , ') Preclude (6)p t f t f p t f t f p t f t fZ Y Y p t t f f       
, , 1 , (7)p t f
p
X t f   
, , , ', ' ,
, ', '
, (8)p t f t f p f
t t f
Z capability p f   
, , (9)p t Launch p
t
X winv p   
6. Discussion 
The objective (0) represents the completion time of the “Assess” phase on the last 
target assessed.    Each constraint (1) ensures that the completion of each target’s 
“Assess” phase provides a bound on the overall completion time.  Each constraint (2) 
ensures that the platform performing the next phase of the kill chain on a target does not 
begin until the current phase has been completed by any platform.  Each constraint (3) 
ensures that the duration of a phase of the kill chain for a target does not exceed the 
minimum processing time of the platform chosen to perform that phase.  Each constraints 
(4) requires that if a platform is chosen to perform a kill chain phase for a different target, 
that it cannot begin that phase until a sequence-dependent setup time (e.g., flight time 
between targets; see below) has been added to the end time of the previous kill chain 
phase end time. 
Each constraint (5) specifies the kill chain phases that must occur sequentially.  
Each constraint (6) regulates which kill chain phases may occur simultaneously, and 
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which phases must occur sequentially.  Each constraint (7) requires for a given kill chain 
phase for a given target, that exactly one platform performs that function (no duplication 
of effort).  Each constraint (8) requires that a platform not perform the same phase of 
multiple kill chains for multiple targets beyond its capacity for that phase.  Each 
constraint (9) requires that a platform launch no more weapons than it has in its original 
weapon inventory. 
Other objective functions are, of course, possible.  For example, we could 
calculate average completion time, which is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the end 
times of all “Assess” phases, or we could minimize the number of targets completed after 
a fixed deadline using a new set of binary variables that indicate whether the end of the 
“Assess” phase for target t occurs after the deadline, etc. 
The most complicated pre-processing that needs to be performed for this model is 
the determination of the parameter , , , ', 'p t f t fsetup  for each platform p, pair of targets t and 
t’, and pair of phases f and f’.  This computation involves the speed of the platform, the 
maximum range at which that platform can perform each of the respective phases, and 
the distance between the targets.  A conservative estimate of these sequence-dependent 
setup costs would assume that the platform begins at the maximum range from target t for 
performing phase f, and as far away as possible from target t’; it then flies directly 
towards target t’ and initiates phase f’ as soon as it gets within the maximum range for 
performing f’ on t’. 
7. New Data 
pspeed   the tactical speed of platform p, i.e., the speed at which it would fly 
according to current CONOPS 
,p frmax  platform p’s maximum range for performing phase f 
, 't tTTdist  the distance between targets t and t’ 
We then have the following: 
 , , , ', ' , , ' , ' /p t f t f p f t t p f psetup rmax TTdist rmax speed    
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where the function (x)+ yields the positive part of x, i.e., the maximum of x and zero.  
Although each of these calculations is straightforward, and can be made using latitude 
and longitude data for each target, the number of such calculations is tremendous and, for 
scenarios of even moderate size (e.g., ten platforms, 30 targets, and seven kill chain 
phases) can yield models that are too big to be solved as a single, monolithic formulation. 
 In the presence of SAM sites, the setup times become slightly more complicated.  
Given a list of SAM sites, indexed by s: 
8. New Index and Set 
s S   surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, 
and we have a position for each SAM site (latitude and longitude), then the calculation of 
the setup time for a given platform, flying between two targets, must include any extra 
time taken to avoid any intervening SAM site, if that platform is vulnerable to surface-to-
air missiles. 
C. A FAST HEURISTIC 
We use a simple constructive heuristic to build feasible schedules for each target.   
1. How the Heuristic Works 
KCAT is comprised of three subroutines:  (1) Getting Data, (2) Building Kill 
Chains, and (3) Displaying the Results.  When KCAT starts, it presents the planner with a 
welcome screen.  From this welcome screen, the planner can choose to peruse several 
pages of background information related to the Ithaca (or any other) scenario, or the 
planner can go straight to the “Control Panel.” 
a. Getting Data 
Once at the Control Panel, the planner designs the scenario by selecting 
platform types, the number of platforms, each platform’s starting location, the platforms’ 
weapon configurations, and other data such as standoff ranges, TEL dwell time, weather 
state, and the number of targets.  Figure 2 depicts a screen shot of the Control Panel. 
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Figure 2.   Screen shot of KCAT Control Panel. In the ‘Platform and Weapon Data’ 
section, the planner selects, from left to right, the platform type, the platform’s 
starting latitude and longitude, the platform’s first and second weapon type and 
quantity, and the platform’s standoff distance.  In the ‘Other Scenario Parameters’ 
section, the planner selects TEL dwell time, the number of targets for the 
scenario, and the scenario weather state.  To initiate KCAT, the planner selects 
“RUN Kill Chain Analysis Tool (KCAT).” 
The workbook contains worksheets that include the following:  platform 
data, target data, weapon data, and geographic data.   
b. Building Kill Chains 
The heuristic is “greedy” in the sense that, at any point in the heuristic 
when it must decide between platforms to assign to accomplish a specific phase of the 
kill chain for a given target, it will choose the closest capable platform, where a capable 
platform is one that is able to perform that phase of a kill chain.  As the heuristic 
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progresses, it processes phases of the kill chain for each target in sequence, and 
monotonically in time.  Namely, as it assigns platforms to phases of the various kill 
chains, the heuristic keeps track of the elapsed time in the scenario; as the elapsed time 
grows, more phases of each kill chain are assigned to platforms and accomplished, and 
are never re-assigned.  Once the heuristic has assigned platforms to all phases of the kill 
chain for all targets, (and determined start and end times for each phase, for each target), 
it determines final locations for each platform, and then terminates with a feasible 
schedule.   
KCAT begins by performing an initial feasibility check of the planner-
inputted data from the Control Panel.  Feasibility pre-processing includes:  
 Making sure there are enough weapons for each target; 
 Making sure that if a weather state other than clear was selected, then 
there are enough GPS-guided weapons for each target; 
 Making sure that if a platform has a standoff range, then its weapon’s 
maximum range is greater than the standoff range; and 
 Making sure that amongst all of the selected platforms, there is enough 
detection capability to detect each target.   
If KCAT determines the scenario is feasible then it loads scenario data into its data 
structures and calculates the initial distance between each platform and each target and 
SAM site.   
KCAT progresses monotonically through time in the planning horizon.  
This “stepping though time” is similar to the manner in which discrete event simulation 
steps in time from one event to the next scheduled event.  Time starts at zero; as the 
algorithm assigns kill chain phases to platforms, the algorithm time-steps forward 
according to the earliest upcoming event.  There are only two types of upcoming events:  
(1) the completion of a previously assigned task, or, if KCAT did not assign a task, (2) 
the arrival of a forced time step of 0.1 minutes.  If the algorithm assigns multiple tasks, 
then it steps forward only so far as the earliest completion time out of all the assigned kill 
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chain phases.  The minimum time step of 0.1 minutes is our way of handling the case 
where a platform either starts the scenario out of range of all appropriate targets, or 
finishes processing one phase of a kill chain, but is not within range of an appropriate 
target for its next phase.  In either case, the heuristic advances that platform towards an 
appropriate target in 0.1-minute intervals of model time until it is within range of a target. 
Other mechanisms are certainly possible. Whenever the algorithm takes a step in time,  
all platforms move towards their closest target a distance equal to the time step multiplied 
by the platform’s speed.  Eventually, each platform moves within range of its target and 
the heuristic assigns it to the next kill chain phase.   
However, there are three reasons a platform may not be available for 
assignment: (1) the platform may lack the capability to perform the phase, (2) it is already 
handling its maximum number of targets of that phase, or (3) the platform is out of range 
of the target.    
If KCAT successfully finds an available platform, it assigns the desired 
kill chain phase to that platform.  KCAT then determines the next target and phase that 
correlate to the soonest upcoming event time.  In this way, KCAT may skip back and 
forth in task assignments from (target 6, phase 3) to (target 10, phase 6) to (target 5, 
phase 4) and so on until all of the assignments have been made.   
We gather several values for use in the heuristic from the Control Panel: 
numTargets   the total number of targets to attack 
_total p   the total number of platforms in the strike package 
dwell  the length of time a TEL target is vulnerable 
to attack  
plat    the starting latitude of a given platform 
plon    the starting longitude of a given platform 
We create a number of data structures to maintain parameter values and to 
assist in our computations.  We list a few examples in Table 3. 
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Name (Parameters)  Interpretation 
assignment (t, f)  Whether phase f for target t has been assigned 
completion (t, f)  Whether phase f for target t has been assigned 
assignmentTime (t, f)  The time at which phase f for target t was assigned 
completionTime (t, f)  The time at which phase f for target t was completed 
completingPlatform (t, f)  The platform that completed phase f for target t 
distance (p, t)  The distance between platform p and target t 
SAMdistance (p, s)  The distance between platform p and SAM s 
quicknessRatio (p, t)  How quickly platform p’s weapon can get to target t 
gantt (p)  The collection of tasks assigned to platform p 
Table 3.   KCAT Data Structures. Each row provides the name of a data structure used in 
the heuristic and its associated parameters, and its interpretation.  
We provide the Building Kill Chains subroutine in pseudo-code below: 
algorithm build_kill_chains; 
begin  
 if scenario is infeasible then exit sub 
 for each platform p do 
for each target t, calculate distance(p,t) and SAMdistance(p,t) 
  calculate quicknessRatio(p,t)  
 for each target t do  
  assignment(t,0)=TRUE 
  assignment(t,8)=FALSE 
  completion(t,0)=TRUE 
 currentTime, time_stepCounter=0 
 all_assigned, all_completed=FALSE 
 do while all_completed=FALSE 
  something_assigned=FALSE 
  for each target t and function f do 
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   if currentTime=completionTime(t, f) and 
    currentTime<>0 then 
    p=completingPlatform(t,f) 
    if f<>launch then increment platform function 
 capability 
  for each platform p do 
   calculate closest_target(p); closest_assigned_target(p) 
   calculate SAMdistance(p, 0), the distance of the closest 
 SAM s to platform p   
  for every target t do 
   incumbent=0 
   if all_assigned=FALSE then 
    find the lowest (t, f) pair that needs to be assigned 
    if f<=assess then find an incumbent, the closest 
platform p that is capable of performing function f 
for target t 
   if incumbent>0 then 
    set current task properties  
    add current task to gantt (incumbent) 
    something_assigned=TRUE 
   if incumbent=0 then 
 closest_assigned_target(closest platform)=t 
for each target t and function f, determine all_assigned, 
all_completed 
if all_assigned=FALSE and all_completed=FALSE then 
 if something_assigned=TRUE then 
  nextTime = the earliest completion time of  
   the tasks assigned on this iteration 
 if nextTime-currentTime>1 then 
  nextTime=currentTime+1 
 if something_assigned=FALSE then 
  nextTime=currentTime+0.1 
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if all_assigned=TRUE and all_completed=FALSE then 
 nextTime=the earliest completion time of the tasks that are  
  assigned but not completed in Assess phase 
if all_completed=TRUE then 
 for every platform p and target t do 
  calculate distance from last position 
time_step=nextTime-currentTime 
if time_step>0 then 
 for every platform p do 
  update platform position  
  for every target t do 
   calculate distance(p, t) 
   calculate quicknessRatio(p, t) 
  for every SAM s do 
   calculate SAMdistance(p, s) 
 time_stepCounter=time_stepCounter+1 
if time_stepCounter>1000 then 
 scenario is infeasible;  exit sub 
loop 
end 
c. Displaying the Results 
KCAT generates a schedule for each of the platforms and displays all of 
these on a single worksheet.  The schedule details the particulars of each kill chain phase 
KCAT assigns to that platform.  Figure 3 displays a screen shot of the target Gantt chart. 
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Figure 3.   Target Gantt Chart.  Each horizontal strip represents the kill chain for the 
indicated target.  Strip colors are color-coded, alternating between dark and light 
shades, and represent the duration in minutes of an initial idle time, and then the 
consecutive corresponding kill chain phase.  For targets 11, 12, and 15-20, the 
initial idle time is zero, and so is not shown in this diagram. 
2. Feasible Solutions 
A feasible solution is an attack schedule that successfully accomplishes every 
phase of the kill chain for every target.  KCAT pre-processes the scenario inputs to rule 
out infeasible platform, weapon, and target combinations.  Additionally, when KCAT 
processes an attack scenario and advances the elapsed time counter more than 1,000 
times (which takes the elapsed time in the model past 100 minutes), the heuristic 
concludes that a feasible solution is highly unlikely, reports infeasibility, and terminates.     
Although KCAT produces feasible schedules, it does not guarantee optimal 
schedules, or even successful schedules, where we consider a schedule successful if it 
finishes all kill chains before a given deadline.  Recall that, for our example, this deadline 
is given by the TEL dwell time, and is approximately 20 minutes.  The planner can select 
any TEL dwell time he chooses in the control panel; this value represents the window of 
vulnerability for all TEL targets in the scenario.  If a scenario is feasible, but not 
successful, KCAT displays the number of kill chains that exceed the TEL dwell time on 
the “Results” worksheet.  
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IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
We perform all computations on a 3.16 GHz Dell desktop computer at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  KCAT run times have never exceeded 2 seconds.   
A. BASELINE SCENARIO 
KCAT can assess many different models.  We illustrate KCAT using a single 
baseline scenario that looks at an attack in which a package of strike platforms attacks 
multiple transformer-erector launchers (TELs) within a minimum amount of time.   
1. Baseline Scenario Description 
The Baseline Scenario consists of 11 friendly platforms and 20 targets.  Ten of the 
friendly platforms are jet aircraft:  four F/A-18E/Fs, four Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), and 
two Navy Unmanned Combat Air Systems (NUCAS).  The 11-th friendly platform is a 
surface vessel with a vertical launch system (VLS).  Each of the friendly platforms has a 
weapons configuration that the planner chooses. 
We position the two NUCAS closest to the targets at about 50 nm west of the 
center of TBM Area 1.  Next closest are the division of F/A-18s and the division of JSFs, 
each at about 200nm west of TBM Area 1.  Furthest away is the surface vessel, at about 
300 nm from the target area.   
Available weapons are Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Standoff 
Weapon (JSOW), Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), Standoff Land 
Attack Missile Extended Range (SLAM-ER), Tomahawk (TLAM), and seven versions of 
the conceptual High-Speed Weapon (HSW).  We examine the utility of HSW, and its 
impact on the minimization of the longest kill chain duration (i.e., makespan).  The 
platform weapon configuration for the baseline scenario is four AARGM each for the 




each of the first two JSF, two JSOW for the latter two JSF, two JDAM for each NUCAS, 
and 30 HSW version 2 for the surface vessel (Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons 
Division, 2008).   
The twenty targets are mobile TELs.  The TELs are located at various positions 
within a 50-mile radius circle; no pair of TELs is co-located.  We assume that the TELs 
are stationary at the start of the scenario.  The TELs are performing a wave attack in 
which their launch times have been pre-coordinated to occur as close to the same time as 
possible.  We assume all TELs commence launch preparations at the same time, and that 
there are no differences between TELs with respect to launch preparation times.  
Therefore, we assume the dwell time for each TEL to be identical. 
We choose a TEL dwell time of 30 minutes for KCAT 1.0 evaluation, and 20 
minutes for KCAT 1.1 analysis.  The standoff range, due to threat integrated air defense 
systems (IADS), for F/A-18E/Fs is 30nm from any Trinacrian SAMs.  JSF and NUCAS 
do not have associated standoff ranges because we assume they are able to operate 
without restriction due to their stealth.  The weather for the baseline scenario is clear.   
2. Blue Forces Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
The forward-positioned NUCAS search for TELs.  NUCAS are data-linked to the 
F/A-18s, JSFs, surface vessel, and to command and control platforms.  The NUCAS 
detect the targets that are in range, and share these locations with all of the other 
platforms via data link.  Each platform either proceeds towards its target or loiters due to 
standoff distance limitations.  As time passes, each platform moves towards its target 
while executing the phases of the kill chain as required until the scenario is complete.   
3. Using KCAT 
To run KCAT, the planner specifies scenario information through the control 
panel (Figure 2).  From the control panel, the planner chooses platform types, platform 
locations, weapon configurations, weapon quantities, platform standoff ranges, TEL 
dwell times, the number of targets, and the weather state.   
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The baseline scenario target list is a random draw of 45 targets from 170 possible 
target launch sites within TBM Area 1.  Table 4 lists them: 
  Target  Lat  Lon  Tgt name  Tgt Description  Tgt Area 
1  L120  28.76  158.46  TGT_1  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
2  L91  27.73  157.92  TGT_2  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
3  L99  28.43  158.99  TGT_3  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
4  L50  27.48  158.78  TGT_4  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
5  L52  27.22  158.93  TGT_5  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
6  L132  28.52  158.16  TGT_6  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
7  L3  27.87  159.18  TGT_7  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
8  L130  28.44  158.65  TGT_8  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
9  L139  28.76  158.40  TGT_9  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
10  L121  28.69  158.91  TGT_10  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
11  L8  27.48  158.49  TGT_11  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
12  L71  27.69  157.90  TGT_12  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
13  L147  28.49  158.16  TGT_13  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
14  L135  28.34  158.61  TGT_14  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
15  L64  27.59  158.12  TGT_15  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
16  L164  28.17  157.73  TGT_16  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
17  L149  28.37  157.82  TGT_17  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
18  L10  27.33  158.18  TGT_18  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
19  L162  28.54  158.05  TGT_19  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
20  L62  27.89  158.61  TGT_20  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
21  L90  27.94  158.07  TGT_21  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
22  L131  28.56  158.62  TGT_22  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
23  L10  27.33  158.18  TGT_23  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
24  L101  28.06  159.22  TGT_24  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
25  L80  27.83  158.38  TGT_25  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
26  L51  27.87  158.54  TGT_26  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
27  L106  28.05  158.90  TGT_27  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
28  L111  28.47  158.56  TGT_28  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
29  L45  27.45  158.51  TGT_29  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
30  L48  27.65  157.98  TGT_30  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
31  L142  28.71  158.66  TGT_31  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
32  L141  28.10  158.12  TGT_32  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
33  L101  28.06  159.22  TGT_33  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
34  L168  28.44  157.97  TGT_34  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
35  L155  28.50  157.98  TGT_35  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
36  L39  27.93  158.69  TGT_36  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
37  L119  28.38  158.97  TGT_37  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
38  L167  28.33  158.18  TGT_38  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
39  L42  27.75  158.60  TGT_39  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
40  L91  27.73  157.92  TGT_40  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
41  L19  27.72  158.77  TGT_41  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
42  L170  28.47  158.52  TGT_42  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
43  L115  28.79  158.76  TGT_43  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
44  L3  27.87  159.18  TGT_44  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
45  L98  27.94  159.19  TGT_45  TEL Launch Site  TBM A‐1 
Table 4.   Baseline Scenario Target List, including locations of each target in area A-1. 
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 We utilize the target list in Table 4 for all baseline scenario analysis.  Although 
KCAT can draw new targets randomly on each run, we do not use this option during 
testing because the launch area is 50 nm circle, the possible difference in platform-to-
target starting distances could be as large as 100 nm. 
4. Platform Kill Chain Function Parameters 
Different types of platforms have widely varying capabilities.  We model these 
capability differences through the Platform Capability Matrix, which Table 5 depicts.    
 
CAPABILITY MATRIX 
                                  
   Detect  Track  Identify Approve Launch  Control Assess  Speed  Stealth
  Platforms  Cap  Dur  Cap Dur Cap Dur Cap Dur Cap Dur Cap Dur Cap  Dur  nm/min  bin 
  F/A‐18 E/F  5  0.1  5  0.3 5  0.1 5  0.1 8  0.5 5  5.0 5  0.5  10.00  0 
  JSF  5  0.1  10  0.3 10  0.1 10  0.1 8  0.5 10  5.0 10  0.5  10.00  1 
  NUCAS  20  0.1  20  0.3 20  0.1 20  0.1 4  0.5 15  5.0 15  0.5  8.89  1 
  Surface/VLS  0  0.0  0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 30  0.5 0  5.0 0  0.5  0.50  0 
Table 5.   Platform Capability Matrix. For the JSF “Detect” capability, the five represents 
the number of ground targets that a JSF can detect simultaneously, and the 0.1 
represents the minimum processing time (minutes) a JSF requires to detect a 
target. “Track,” “Identify,” etc. follow in suit. Speed represents the JSF 
operational speed of 10.0 nm/minute, and the stealth value of 1 represents JSF 
transparency to threat integrated air defenses (IADS).  
 The capability matrix lists the four available platforms and their respective 
capabilities in terms of the seven phases of the kill chain, as well as speed and stealth.  
The numbers used in this matrix are notional, and unclassified.  The planner may amend 
this matrix as desired to describe platform capabilities more accurately.  
 Within each phase of the kill chain, each platform has a capability and duration.  
Capability refers to the maximum number of targets on which that platform can 
simultaneously perform that particular function.  For example, the surface ship has no 
capability to detect mobile TELs and therefore its “Detect” capability score is zero, 
whereas NUCAS has a specialized sensor suite and is rated at 20 simultaneous targets.  
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Duration refers to the minimum amount of time that a platform needs to perform a 
function.  In “Launch,” for example, all platforms are assigned a duration of 0.5 minutes 
to conservatively describe a weapon’s launch-to-eject cycle.  We assume “Identify” and 
“Approve” occur instantaneously in this thesis.  However, in order to track the progress 
of these distinct events numerically, we assign them values of 0.1 minutes.  We choose 
0.1 minutes because this period is very small with respect to typical scenario maximum 
makespans and thus has very little effect.   
 The “Control” phase models weapon time-of-flight (TOF).   KCAT dynamically 
computes each platform’s “Control” duration during the execution of the algorithm based 
on the launch platform’s distance from the target and the speed of the weapon.   
 We model platform speed as the operational speed:  the speed at which the 
platform would reasonably travel during this mission.  Stealth refers to whether the 
platform is completely transparent to threat IADS. 
5. Kill Chain Metrics 
We use makespan, or the maximum completion time of all of assigned targets, as 
our primary metric for analysis.  Additionally, KCAT counts the number of targets whose 
completion time exceeds the TEL dwell time as a measure of overall lateness in the 
scenario.  Finally, KCAT reports the minimum completion time and an average 
completion time for all of the targets in that scenario. 
B. INITIAL RESULTS FOR KCAT VERSION 1.0 
Initial results show that KCAT produces feasible schedules.  Many of the feasible 
schedules are clearly not optimal but did indicate trends. 
1. KCAT Outputs 
After the planner runs KCAT, he sees a results summary screen.  From this 
screen, KCAT presents links to the three outputs:  (1) a map display of the scenario, (2) a 
Gantt chart for the targets, and (3) a schedule for the platforms. 
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2. Solution Quality 
KCAT 1.0 solutions were feasible, but in many cases were clearly not optimal.  
The makespans for a variety of different scenario configurations were high, on the order 
of 30–40 minutes.  There was little variation in the makespans across a wide spectrum of 
inputs.  Makespans generally decreased when starting parameters were less restrictive 
(i.e., more platforms were available, or had more weapons, or had weapons with longer 
ranges, etc.).  Since KCAT is a heuristic, we were not surprised to see that, in some of 
these cases the makespans actually lengthened.   
3. Heuristic Problem Areas 
Quite a few KCAT 1.0 Gantt charts indicated that schedules were being stacked, 
i.e., placed end-to-end.   This is contrary to the desired function of the heuristic in that a 
“good” solution would make optimal use of available resources by allocating them in 
parallel to the maximum extent possible to reduce the scenario makespan.  This stacking 
effect appears to dominate the makespan results for KCAT 1.0. 
Secondly, Gantt charts indicated that weapon fly-out times were also dominating 
the makespan, an affect that doubled when stacking occurred.  The long weapon flight 
times even arise in scenarios in which high-speed weapons are available.  This indicates 
that we can improve upon KCAT’s method of choosing a platform for the “Launch” 
phase of the kill chain. 
4. Changing the Number of Targets 
As the number of targets increases from 15 to 45, makespans generally remain 
constant at about 28 minutes.  The two longest makespans result from scenarios with 16 
or 17 targets, which is contrary to expected results.  As the number of targets increases 
from 32 to 45, makespans do exhibit a near-linear increase.  
With a 30-minute TEL dwell time, makespans exceed the dwell time at a rate of 9 
out of 30 targets.  The number of tardy makespans was generally one or two; this appears 
to be a result of schedule stacking within the algorithm.    
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Scenario minimum and average times hold very constant at about 11 minutes and 
20 minutes, respectively.  We highlight the baseline scenario as a consistent frame of 
reference in yellow.  Table 6 summarizes these results. 
 
# tgts  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
15  TRUE  0  20.60  23.34  29.30 
16  FALSE  2  19.60  23.72  35.00 
17  FALSE  2  19.60  23.46  34.70 
18  TRUE  0  11.40  20.46  28.10 
19  TRUE  0  11.40  20.58  28.10 
20  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
21  TRUE  0  11.40  20.17  28.10 
22  TRUE  0  11.40  20.33  28.10 
23  TRUE  0  11.40  19.94  28.10 
24  TRUE  0  11.40  20.13  28.10 
25  TRUE  0  11.40  20.23  28.10 
26  TRUE  0  11.40  20.33  28.10 
27  TRUE  0  11.40  20.46  28.10 
28  TRUE  0  11.40  20.57  28.10 
29  TRUE  0  11.40  20.81  28.00 
30  FALSE  1  11.20  20.66  30.80 
31  FALSE  1  11.20  20.76  30.80 
32  TRUE  0  11.20  17.84  24.00 
33  TRUE  0  11.20  18.06  25.10 
34  TRUE  0  11.20  17.93  25.10 
35  TRUE  0  11.20  18.97  29.80 
36  TRUE  0  11.20  17.86  25.70 
37  TRUE  0  11.20  18.12  27.40 
38  TRUE  0  11.20  18.02  27.40 
39  TRUE  0  11.20  17.57  27.70 
40  TRUE  0  11.20  17.51  27.70 
41  FALSE  1  11.20  18.51  30.30 
42  FALSE  1  11.20  18.30  30.40 
43  FALSE  1  11.20  18.52  30.40 
44  FALSE  2  11.20  18.78  30.40 
45  FALSE  3  11.20  19.14  34.60 
Table 6.   KCAT 1.0 Results, Changing the Number of Targets. From left to right, for 40 
targets, the scenario is successful, has 0 tardy kill chains, has a minimum kill 
chain duration of 11.20 minutes, an average kill chain duration of 17.51 minutes, 
and a makespan of 27.80 minutes. 
5. Changing Platform Weapon Configurations 
We examine a number of different weapon configurations, with specific emphasis 
on looking at the affect of high-speed weapon availability.  Model results are counter-
intuitive in that replacing slower, shorter-range weapons with faster and longer-range 
weapons appears to increase or only slightly improve upon the baseline makespan.  Table 
7 presents these results. 
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Weapons  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
2 HSW1 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  9.60  17.88  27.50 
2 HSW1 air / vice F18 ARGMM  TRUE  0  9.50  17.60  27.50 
2 HSW1 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  10.70  19.38  27.30 
2 HSW1 air / vice JSF JSOW  FALSE  1  10.80  19.62  31.20 
HSW1 VLS  FALSE  11  16.10  28.64  36.70 
2 HSW2 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  7.00  16.04  23.40 
2 HSW2 air / vice F18 ARGMM  TRUE  0  7.00  17.39  25.20 
2 HSW2 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  7.80  18.21  28.20 
2 HSW2 air / vice JSF JSOW  FALSE  1  7.80  18.46  33.10 
HSW2 VLS  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
2 HSW3 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  5.80  16.03  29.70 
2 HSW3 air / vice F18 ARGMM  FALSE  1  5.80  18.32  34.40 
2 HSW3 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  6.40  18.94  29.30 
2 HSW3 air / vice JSF JSOW  FALSE  4  6.40  20.18  34.30 
HSW3 VLS  TRUE  0  8.80  17.16  21.90 
HSW4 VLS  TRUE  0  7.70  18.67  29.50 
all JSOW  TRUE  0  5.00  18.97  28.90 
all SLAM‐ER  FALSE  4  19.50  25.11  33.60 
all HSW1 air  FALSE  1  9.50  15.62  31.20 
Table 7.   KCAT 1.0 Results, Weapon Configuration Variations. In the first row, under 
‘Weapons,’ Table 7 indicates that two HSW1 air weapons replace two SLAM-
ERs for the F/A-18s in the baseline scenario. Continuing to the right, the 
scenario is “successful,” the number of tardy kill chains is 0, the duration of the 
shortest kill chain is 9.60 minutes, the average of all kill chain durations is 17.88 
minutes, and the makespan is27.50 minutes. 
6. Changing the Availability of a Surface Vessel 
The Baseline Scenario includes one surface vessel with VLS capability.  
Removing the surface platform from the scenario caused an increase in makespan as 
expected.   
 
Ship  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
no‐ship  FALSE  1  19.60  23.34  31.50 
ship  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
Table 8.   KCAT 1.0 Results, Surface Asset Availability. In the first row, for ‘no-ship,’ the 
scenario is not “successful,” the number of tardy kill chains is one, the duration 
of the shortest kill chain is 19.60 minutes, the average of all kill chain durations 
is 23.34 minutes, and the makespan is 31.50 minutes. 
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7. Changing the Composition of Packages 
The baseline scenario contains an attack package of four F/A-18E/Fs, four JSF, 
two NUCAS, and one surface vessel.  We represent this composition in Table 9 as a 
vector of four numbers, (4, 4, 2, 1), which represents the number of each type of 
platform, in the order (F/A-18E/F, JSF, NUCAS, surface vessel).  We replace the division 
of JSF by F/A-18s, and as expected (due to a lack of stealth), the makespan increased 
dramatically and became infeasible with seven tardy kill chains.  We then replace the 
F/A-18s by JSF, and observe slight increases in scenario makespan.  Replacing two F/A-
18s by two NUCAS results in significant makespan reductions.  When the package 
consists of four NUCAS and one surface vessel, the makespan achieves its lowest 
average and maximum values.  Table 9 describes these results. 
 
Package Composition  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
(4,4,2,1)  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
(8,0,2,1)  FALSE  7  19.60  30.69  55.90 
(0,8,2,1)  TRUE  0  19.60  22.70  28.70 
(2,4,4,1)  TRUE  0  5.00  14.92  23.80 
(0,0,4,1)  TRUE  0  7.60  11.24  17.20 
Table 9.   KCAT 1.0 Results, Package Composition Variations. In the second row, for the 
package composition (8, 0, 2, 1), the scenario is not “successful,” the number of 
tardy kill chains is seven, the duration of the shortest kill chain is 19.60 minutes, 
the average of all kill chain durations is 30.69 minutes, and the makespan is 
55.90 minutes. 
8. Changing the Number of Missiles Available to the Surface Vessel 
The Baseline Scenario allows 30 missiles for the surface vessel.  We decrease this 
number in an attempt to determine the effects a lesser number of missiles would have on 
the makespan.  KCAT 1.0 results show that the makespan held constant until the number 
of missiles reached seven, at which point the makespan began to increase significantly.  
When fewer than four missiles were available, KCAT 1.0 does not reach a feasible 




# of Ship Missiles  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
           
30  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
20  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
19  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
10  TRUE  0  11.40  20.72  28.10 
9  TRUE  0  11.40  20.83  28.10 
8  TRUE  0  11.40  20.87  28.10 
7  FALSE  1  11.40  21.27  30.70 
6  FALSE  1  11.40  21.34  30.20 
5  FALSE  1  11.40  21.51  30.20 
4  FALSE  3  11.40  22.33  37.00 
3  FALSE         
2  FALSE         
1  FALSE         
Table 10.   KCAT 1.0 Results, Number of Available Missiles to Surface Platform. In the 
first row, for 30 missiles, the scenario is “successful,” there are zero tardy kill 
chains, the duration of the shortest kill chain is 11.40 minutes, the average of all 
kill chain durations is 20.72 minutes, and the makespan is 28.10 minutes 
9. Heuristic Improvements 
The two main areas for improvement in KCAT 1.0 relate to (1) the observed 
stacking of kill chain schedules, resulting in excessive and counter-intuitive makespan 
results, and (2) the heuristic’s method of choosing a launch platform, which resulted in 
the choice of slower weapons even in the presence of high-speed weapons.    
We address the stacking problem by forcing the heuristic to stop at each one-
minute interval to “look” for platforms to perform kill chain phases.  In KCAT 1.0, the 
heuristic moves monotonically forward in time to the next scheduled event.  While this 
works well for kill chain phases of short duration, phases of long duration (i.e., the 
“Control” phase in which durations could be as large as 18 or 20 minutes), cause a 
“blank” period.  During the blank period, the heuristic will not attempt to assign kill 
chain phases and thus creates the observed stacking anomaly. 
We correct KCAT 1.0’s choice of slower weapons amidst higher-speed weapons 
by revising the heuristic’s “greedy” platform assignment process.  Instead of basing 
platform assignments on platform distance to a prospective target, we base it on platform 
quickness, where quickness is the ratio of a platform’s distance to a target to platform 
speed.  In other words, if one platform is twice as fast, but is located one mile further 
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from a target than another platform, we desire the heuristic to choose the further platform 
because it can perform the kill chain phase more quickly.  Platform “quickness” is 
especially important when KCAT chooses a platform for the “Launch” phase of a kill 
chain.  This is because, depending on the weapon, the time of flight can be quite large 
and may thus dominate the makespan.   
Because the baseline scenario assumes that all of the platforms travel at similar 
speeds, distance works well as a surrogate for quickness for all phases of the kill chain 
except for the “Launch” phase.  For the “Launch” phase, weapon speed is very important 
to the weapon’s total time-of-flight.  Therefore, we develop a “quickness ratio,” which is 
a platform’s distance to the target divided by the speed of the platform’s weapon.  In this 
way, KCAT 1.1 now chooses the platform that is able to get its weapon to the target the 
quickest for “Launch” phases, whereas in the other phases it chooses the closest platform. 
C. KCAT VERSION 1.1 RESULTS 
KCAT 1.1 achieves feasible results that are superior to KCAT 1.0.  For the 
baseline scenario, the KCAT 1.1 makespan was 17.9 minutes as compared to 28.1 
minutes for KCAT 1.0.  This represents a 36.3% improvement.  With respect to average 
completion times across a variation in the number of targets, KCAT 1.1 averages 
approximately 15 minutes, while KCAT 1.0 averages about 20 minutes.  This represents 
a 25% improvement in average completion time. 
Because the KCAT 1.1 consistently produced makespans spanning fewer than 20 
minutes, we reduce the TEL dwell time to 20 minutes vice 30 minutes.  We also relax the 
Detect, Track, Identify, Approve, and Assess range constraints from 50 nm to 75 nm to 
more accurately model NUCAS target interaction.   
1. Changing the Number of Targets 
As the number of targets increased from 15 to 45, KCAT 1.1 makespan held 
steady at 17.9 minutes until reaching 30 targets.  At 30 targets, we observe a steep 
increase to makespans of about 34 minutes.  We attribute this to the expenditure of all of 






# Tgts  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
15  TRUE  0  11.10  14.13  18.10 
16  TRUE  0  11.10  13.84  17.90 
17  TRUE  0  11.10  13.70  17.90 
18  TRUE  0  11.10  13.57  17.90 
19  TRUE  0  11.10  13.48  17.90 
20  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
21  TRUE  0  11.10  13.34  17.90 
22  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
23  TRUE  0  11.10  13.34  17.90 
24  TRUE  0  11.10  13.52  17.90 
25  TRUE  0  11.10  13.46  17.90 
26  TRUE  0  11.10  13.41  17.90 
27  TRUE  0  11.10  13.47  17.90 
28  TRUE  0  11.10  13.50  17.90 
29  TRUE  0  11.10  13.45  17.90 
30  FALSE  1  11.10  13.55  22.90 
31  FALSE  2  11.10  13.90  26.40 
32  FALSE  2  11.10  14.31  33.30 
33  FALSE  3  11.10  14.89  33.40 
34  FALSE  4  11.10  15.25  33.40 
35  FALSE  5  11.10  15.50  33.70 
36  FALSE  6  11.10  15.52  33.80 
37  FALSE  7  11.10  15.65  33.80 
38  FALSE  8  11.10  15.91  33.80 
39  FALSE  10  11.10  15.97  33.90 
40  FALSE  10  11.10  16.41  33.90 
41  FALSE  11  11.10  16.62  31.90 
42  FALSE  13  11.10  16.37  33.60 
43  FALSE  14  11.10  16.65  33.60 
44  FALSE  15  11.10  16.97  33.60 
45  FALSE  16  11.10  17.28  33.60 
Table 11.   KCAT 1.1 Results, Changing the Number of Targets. From left to right, for 39 
targets, the scenario is not “successful,” there are 10 tardy kill chains, the 
duration of the shortest kill chain is 11.10 minutes, the average of all kill chain 




Figure 4.   KCAT Results, Variation in the Number of Targets. For 20 targets, the 
minimum kill chain duration is approximately 10 minutes, the average kill chain 
duration is approximately 14 minutes, and the makespan is approximately 18 
minutes. 
2. Changing Platform Weapon Configurations 
Changes in the weapon configuration of the F/A-18s and JSF did not affect the 
makespan at all in most cases.  We attribute this result to the geographic positioning of 
the platforms and targets at the start of the scenario.    
When the surface vessel launched High-Speed Weapon version 1 instead of the 
faster version 2, the makespan increased significantly and no longer finished within the 
TEL dwell time of 20 minutes.  We display KCAT 1.1 results for changes in weapon 






Weapon Configuration  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
2 HSW1 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  10.00  13.25  17.90 
2 HSW1 air / vice F18 ARGMM  TRUE  0  9.50  12.97  17.90 
2 HSW1 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  10.20  13.28  17.90 
2 HSW1 air / vice JSF JSOW  TRUE  0  10.30  13.30  17.90 
HSW1 VLS  FALSE  6  15.60  18.45  23.40 
2 HSW2 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  7.30  12.68  17.90 
2 HSW2 air / vice F18 ARGMM  TRUE  0  7.30  12.68  17.90 
2 HSW2 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  7.40  12.70  17.90 
2 HSW2 air / vice JSF JSOW  TRUE  0  7.50  12.71  17.90 
HSW2 VLS  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
2 HSW3 air / vice F18 SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  6.00  12.40  17.90 
2 HSW3 air / vice F18 ARGMM  TRUE  0  6.00  12.40  17.90 
2 HSW3 air / vice JSF JDAM  TRUE  0  6.10  12.42  17.90 
2 HSW3 air / vice JSF JSOW  TRUE  0  6.20  12.43  17.90 
HSW3 VLS  TRUE  0  8.60  10.64  14.80 
HSW4 VLS  TRUE  0  7.50  9.44  13.50 
all JSOW  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
all SLAM‐ER  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
all HSW1 air  TRUE  0  9.60  12.67  17.90 
Table 12.   KCAT 1.1 Results, Changing Platform Weapon Configurations. In the first row, 
under ‘Weapons,’ Table 12 indicates that two HSW1 air weapons replace two 
SLAM-ERs for the F/A-18s in the baseline scenario. Continuing to the right, the 
scenario is “successful,” the number of tardy kill chains is zero, the duration of 
the shortest kill chain is 10.00 minutes, the average of all kill chain durations is 
13.25 minutes, and the makespan is 17.90 minutes. 
Figures 5 and 6 are the Gantt chart and scenario map, respectively, for the 
scenario in which all F/A-18s and JSF are loaded with High-Speed Weapon version 1.  
From Table 12, we see that the makespan for this scenario was 17.9 minutes.  This does 
not improve upon the baseline scenario (a counter-intuitive result).   
Examination of the scenario map and Gantt chart for this scenario reveals a 
correlation between target distance and makespan.  Targets 1, 3, 7, and 10, the four 
targets with the longest completion times in the scenario, are also four of the six 













Figure 5.   KCAT 1.1 Gantt Chart. For target 1, the Detect phase begins at 
approximately 3 minutes after the start of the scenario.  The Track, Identify, 
Approve, and Launch phases take short amounts of time and complete after 
approximately 4 minutes of total elapsed time.  The control phase, representing 
weapon TOF extends from 4 minutes until 15 minutes.  Assess begins at 15 
minutes and concludes at approximately 16 minutes. 
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Figure 6.   KCAT 1.1 Scenario Map. The scenario map displays the positions in 
degrees latitude and longitude of the platforms, targets, and SAMs in the scenario.  
The map displays position data for times at which a kill chain phase is beginning 
or ending for any of the targets. 
3. Changing the Availability of a Surface Vessel 
We remove the surface vessel with VLS from the scenario, and observe that the 
makespan increases as expected.  The scenario no longer accomplishes the kill chain 
during the TEL dwell time.  Table 13 presents these results. 
 
Ship  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
no‐ship  FALSE  2  9.60  13.37  24.20 
ship  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
Table 13.   KCAT 1.1 Results, Availability of a Surface Vessel. For ‘no-ship,’ the scenario 
is not “successful,” the number of tardy kill chains is two, the duration of the 
shortest kill chain is 9.60 minutes, the average of all kill chain durations is 13.37 
minutes, and the makespan is 24.20 minutes. 
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In Figure 7, we observe that for this scenario KCAT assigns a platform to perform 
“Track” for a long time before assigning weapon launch.  KCAT vectors the two 
NUCAS, which are located furthest east at the start of the scenario, to hit the furthest 
targets with their JDAM. 
 
 
Figure 7.   KCAT 1.1 Gantt Chart Depicting Scenario Without a Surface Vessel.  
4. Changing the Composition of Packages 
When the surface vessel is present and armed with High-speed weapons, KCAT 
chooses it as the launching vessel in almost all cases.  When NUCAS is present, KCAT 
chooses it to perform almost all of the other kill chain functions.  For this reason, removal 
of all of the F/A-18E/Fs and JSF does not affect the makespan of the scenario 
significantly.  Several NUCAS and one surface vessel appear to be nearly as effective as 






package composition  Success  # Tardy  Min  Avg  Max 
(4,4,2,1)  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
(8,0,2,1)  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
(0,8,2,1)  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
(2,4,4,1)  TRUE  0  11.10  13.43  17.90 
(0,0,4,1)  TRUE  0  11.10  13.40  18.30 
Table 14.   KCAT 1.1 Results, Changing the Composition of Platforms. In the first row, the 
package composition is (4, 4, 2, 1).  The scenario is “successful,” the number of 
tardy kill chains is zero, the duration of the shortest kill chain is 11.10 minutes, 
the average of all kill chain durations is 13.43 minutes, and the makespan is 
17.90 minutes 
5. Changing the Number of Missiles Available to the Surface Vessel 
As we decrease the number of missiles available to the surface vessel, the 
makespan increased.  Because the surface vessel is the preferred “Launch” platform, and 
because there are 20 targets in the baseline scenario, the makespan increases significantly 
when the surface vessel had fewer than 20 missiles available for “Launch.”  As the 
number of missiles decreased further, the makespan continued to increase a slower rate.  
Figure 8 displays these results. 
 
Figure 8.   KCAT 1.1 Results, Changing the Number of Missiles Available to the 
Surface Vessel. When 20 missiles are available, the makespan is approximately 
18 minutes. 
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6. Changing the Target Deck for the Baseline Scenario 
Makespans vary little in the baseline scenario as the target deck changes.  We 
perform 40 random samples from the pool of 170 TEL launch site locations within TBM 
Area 1 to investigate how the geographic arrangement of targets affects the makespan.  
Each random sample consists of 20 targets (the number of targets in the baseline 
scenario).   The mean makespan of the data is 21.27 minutes +/- 0.60 minutes.  We 
observe a maximum makespan of 27.7 minutes, and a minimum makespan of 16.6 
minutes.  The baseline scenario’s makespan of 17.9 minutes is within one standard 
deviation of the computed sample mean. 
7. Heuristic Problem Areas and Possible Improvements 
Although KCAT 1.1 produces makespans of much shorter duration than KCAT 
1.0, one significant area for improvement remains.  The logic in KCAT that assigns the 
direction that a platform moves is simplistic and can lead to extended makespans, or 
possibly infeasibility due to the number of iterations.  When KCAT assigns a platform to 
one or more kill chain phases, it moves towards the closest target for which it is 
performing the kill chain phase.  When a platform is not assigned a kill chain phase, it 
moves towards whichever target is closest geographically.   
In some cases, KCAT assigns platforms to a target that is located far from the 
other targets, and in this manner, steers the platform away from areas where KCAT could 
utilize the platform’s capabilities more effectively.  If KCAT’s platform capability 
settings are set relatively low, at 30 nm for example, then as the platform heads away 
from a group of targets it may become ineligible to participate in kill chains for those 
targets.  Improving KCAT’s platform directive logic could thus lead to significantly 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
In this thesis, we have described KCAT (Kill Chain Assessment Tool), an 
assessment tool for air-to-ground kill chain analysis.  KCAT comprises a Microsoft 
Excel-based graphical user interface (GUI), a heuristic solver, and three output products.   
B. OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS 
KCAT enables the Warfare Analysis and Integration Branch of Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) China Lake, CA, to 
perform a multitude of platform and weapon analyses.  It addresses one of the most 
difficult challenges in warfare today: time-critical strike. 
Active defense strategies garner most of today’s activity in the realm of theater 
ballistic missile defense (TBMD).  KCAT offers insights into the just-as-important 
strategy of counterforce.  KCAT results can inform the larger picture of TBMD, in which 
both active defense and counterforce strategies are important components. 
KCAT is capable of handling current and contemplated future weapon platforms 
and weapons.  KCAT allows the planner to make performance comparisons between 
similar versions of the same weapon system, or between vastly different systems.  The 
planner may use these comparisons as a foundation for analysis of alternatives studies. 
Although set near the fictitious island Ithaca, the planner may adjust KCAT quite 
easily to represent any MCO in existence today.  Additionally, the planner can alter 
weapon and platform parameters to more accurately represent actual platform and 
weapon functionality at other classification levels. 
KCAT produces feasible results in two seconds or less.  Results are not optimal, 
but do provide insights and indicate trends.  KCAT runs on any computer system with 
Microsoft Excel, and is scalable to handle scenarios anywhere from a few platforms and 
targets to 12 platforms and 45 targets. 
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C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
KCAT will ideally generate provably optimal solutions.  Future developments fall 
into two categories:  heuristic algorithm improvements, and broadening KCAT functional 
capabilities. 
1. Heuristic Improvements 
We could improve KCAT’s solutions by using them as starting solutions in a 
neighborhood search algorithm that makes intelligent schedule swaps, such as 
exchanging two platforms between targets to reduce their overall travel times, or 
swapping two phases of different targets processed by the same platform to reduce that 
single platform’s flight time.  These schedule swaps are “good” if they improve the 
solution in terms of further minimizing the scenario makespan.   
Eventually, we wish to build upon the integer linear programming formulation in 
Chapter III and successfully develop an integer linear program that produces provably 
optimal solutions. 
Future work could reduce scenario makespans by implementing a more effective 
mechanism to govern platform routing commands.  One option is to route platforms 
based on the geographic arrangement of all of the targets instead of on just the closest 
target.   
2. Functional Improvements 
In its current state, KCAT includes four Navy or joint platforms.  A broadening in 
the choice of platforms to include Air Force and possibly Marine Corps and Army units 
would be beneficial considering the joint nature of current and future operations.    
Similarly, we could increase the variety of weapons available to planners, such as 
those used by the Air Force, to broaden the types of scenarios for which KCAT is 
appropriate.  We did not consider the effect of GPS jamming in this thesis.  Future work 
towards quantification of these effects would definitely be worthwhile.  Similarly, future 
work can take into account weather constraints.   
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We did not model network connectivity in this thesis.  Future work could entail 
implementation of network connectivity constraints in both the integer linear program 
and in the heuristic solver to ensure that KCAT maintains network connectivity for each 
platform that requires it. 
Future work can model the details of the “Identification” and “Approval” phases 
of the kill chain.  For the Baseline Scenario, in which the targets are already well defined, 
identification and approval are straightforward.  However, in other forms of time-critical 
targeting, identification and approval can be the most difficult portions of the kill chain. 
Finally, we believe future work can include improving the graphical user interface 
(GUI) of KCAT both in terms of inputting scenario data and in terms of improving output 
products.  Future work can apply existing commercial software to improve upon KCAT 
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